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Survey of Professional Responsibility
PRIVITY REQUIREMENT FOR ATTORNEY LIABILITY TO NONCLIENTS
In 1879, the United States Supreme Court promulgated the
view that only a client could bring a negligence action against an
attorney acting in his professional capacity.' The Court, noting
that attorneys were not in privity with nonclients, held that no
contractual duty to protect nonclient interests existed.2 Until re-
cently, the legal profession escaped liability for negligent misrep-
resentation that adversely affected the interests of third party
nonclients.'
See National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879). An attorney had certified
that his client's title on land was good and Savings Bank gave the client a mortgage. Id. at
196. The buyer defaulted and the bank found that the mortgagor's title was not good. Id.
The bank sued the attorney and the Court ruled that, absent fraud or collusion, an attor-
ney owed no duty to a nonclient not in privity. Id. at 199-200.
Generally, an attorney is liable to his clients for "want of such skill, care and diligence as
men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such matters of professional
employment." Id. According to the Canons that guide the legal profession, "[a] lawyer
should represent a client competently." ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
CANON 6 (1980). Courts have been reluctant to hold an attorney liable to a nonclient for
intentional tort, except in instances of fraud. See, e.g., Meier v. Pearlman, 401 N.E.2d 31,
40 (Ind. 1980) (no liability to third parties absent fraud), cert. denied 449 U.S. 1128 (1981);
Marker v. Greenberg, 313 N.W.2d 4, 5 (Minn. 1981) (strict privity required for attorney
tort liability, except for fraud or improper motive); Harder v. McGinn, 89 App. Div. 2d
732, 733, 454 N.Y.S.2d 42, 43 (3d Dep't. 1982) (absent fraud, collusion, malicious or tor-
tious act, attorney not liable to nonclient), affd, 58 N.Y.2d 663, 444 N.E.2d 1006, 458
N.Y.S.2d 542; Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 329, 401 N.W.2d 816,
826 (1987) (absent affirmative showing of fraud, attorney's are not liable to nonclients). See
also Probert & Hendricks, Lawyer Malpractice: Duty Relationships Beyond Contract, 55 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 708, 708 (1980). "Traditionally, lawyers were largely immune from non-client
claims short of fraud or collusion." Id.
A person suing in negligence must have been owed a duty arising either from contract or
otherwise. See Savings Bank, 100 U.S. at 202 (citation omitted). This protects the defendant
from being held liable for every event down the chain that might be a result of his negli-
gence. Id. With respect to attorneys, "the judiciary has tended to reflect the general profes-
sional attitude that a lawyer should be concerned mainly, if not only, with his client's inter-
est." Probert & Hendricks, supra, at 708. To establish a prima facie case in negligence, the
plaintiff must show: 1) a duty for the defendant to have used reasonable care; 2) a breach
of that duty: 3) proximate cause; and 4) damages from that breach. W. Keeton, D. Dobbs,
R. Keeton & D. Owen, PROSSER and KEETON on the LAW of TORTS § 30 164-65 (5th ed.
1984). See generally Note, Attorneys' Negligence and Third Parties, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV 126,
132-37 (1982) (discusses "historical force of privity" in determining attorney liability).
' See Savings Bank, 100 U.S. at 203. The Savings Bank Court reasoned that since only
parties in privity could sue on a contract, the same standard should apply to a tort claim
arising out of that contractual relationship. Id. at 203-06.
' Probert & Hendricks, supra note 1, at 708. In the early 1960's, the bar against recov-
ery by nonclients began to lift. See Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962). The beneficiaries under a will sued the
testator's attorney who prepared the will. Id. at 584, 364 P.2d at 686, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
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Currently, jurisdictions that recognize an action for negligent
misrepresentation against attorneys by third parties attempt to
harmonize traditional tort and contract doctrines with public pol-
icy considerations to allow equitable recovery.4 This Survey will
examine those jurisdictions and will further examine the issue in
New York. Traditionally, New York has required privity between
the plaintiff and defendant attorney as a prerequisite for recovery
in professional negligence. Recently, however, the federal district
court restated New York's privity rule in Vereins-Und Westbank, AG
v. Carter,5 placing this requirement in jeopardy.
I. THE EVOLVING NEW YORK VIEW
In 1922, The New York Court of Appeals first allowed recovery
by a third party for economic damages due to professional negli-
gence in Glanzer v. Shepard.' The court in Glanzer allowed recov-
ery to a purchaser of beans, not in privity with a public weigher,
stating that the "end and aim" of the transaction was for the ben-
efit of the buyer.' The same court in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,8
Although the Lucas court found the attorney not to be liable to the beneficiaries for trust
provisions that violated state law, it rejected a per se rule. Id. at 591, 364 P.2d at 690-91,
15 Cal. Rptr. at 825-27. The Supreme Court of California articulated a more liberal view
of recovery balancing policy considerations. Id. at 588, 364 P.2d at 687, 15 Cal. Rptr. at
823. See also infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text (list of factors considered by the
court). Generally, privity as a prerequisite for recovery in negligence has been weakened in
New York. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (lack
of privity not a bar to action in negligence). See infra, notes 7-9 and accompanying text
(expansion of negligence recovery without privity).
' See Lucas, 56 Cal. 2d at 588, 364 P.2d at 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 824 (balancing factors
determine existence of duty and liability); Pelham v. Griesheimer, 92 Ill. 2d 13, 21, 440
N.E.2d 96, 100 (1982) (tort recovery allowed if nonclient proves traditional negligence
elements and that he was intended contract beneficiary); Simon v. Zipperstein, 32 Ohio St.
3d 74, 77, 512 N.E.2d 636, 638 (1987) (no liability to third party not in privity unless
attorney acts with actual malice).
There are several public policy justifications for allowing third parties to recover from
attorneys in negligence. See Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss: A
Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1513, 1520-21 (1985). Two major rationales include: 1) at-
torneys are better able than third parties "to spread the cost of careless lawyering"; and 2)
attorneys are given a greater incentive to exercise a higher degree of care. See also Note,
supra note 1, at 128 (attorneys better able than innocent third parties to absorb loss
through insurance).
' 691 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
6 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
7 Id. at 238-39, 135 N.E. at 277.Glanzer involved a public weigher sued by a purchaser
who relied on the weigher's negligently prepared certificate. Id. at 238, 135 N.E. at 275. In
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distinguished Glanzer and held that the creation of accountant lia-
bility to third parties for negligence would expose them to liability
"in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an in-
determinate class." 9 The Ultramares court stated that a suit for
negligent misrepresentation required that the relation between
the plaintiff and defendant be "so close as to approach that of
privity, if not completely one with it." 1 The Ultramares doctrine
was later refined and applied in Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur An-
dersen & Co." to allow certain nonprivity plaintiffs to recover
from accountants for negligent acts. The Ultramares doctrine re-
mains the standard employed in New York to determine the liabil-
ity of professionals for negligence to nonprivity claimants.12
Notwithstanding the traditional approach to which New York
still adheres, the court of appeals has begun to relax its standard.
In a recent decision, where the Ultramares doctrine was applied to
engineers, the court held that privity of contract was not a prereq-
uisite to recover for negligent misrepresentation which produced
Glanzer, "the bond was so close as to approach that of privity, if not completely one with
it." Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 182-83, 174 N.E. 441, 446 (1931). The ser-
vice performed by the public weigher was primarily for the information of the third party.
Id at 183, 174 N.E. at 446.
8 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
" Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 179, 174 N.E. at 443. Judge Cardozo pointed out in Ultramares
that if an accountant was liable to anyone who might rely on his balance sheet then:
[Ijawyers who certify their opinion as to the validity of municipal or corporate bonds
with knowledge that the opinion will be brought to the notice of the public, will
become liable to the investors, if they have overlooked a statute or a decision, to the
same extent as if the controversy were one between client and adviser.
Id. at 188, 174 N.E. at 448. See generally Note, supra note 1, at 132-37.
10 Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 182-83, 174 N.E. at 446.
" 65 N.Y.2d 536, 551, 483 N.E.2d 110, 118, 493 N.Y.S.2d 435, 443 (1985).
" Id. In Credit Alliance, the New York Court of Appeals refined the Ultramares doctrine
and held that an accountant will be liable to third parties when the following conditions are
met:
1) the accountants must have been aware that the financial reports were to be used
for a particular purpose or purposes;
2) in the furtherance of which a known party or parties was intended to rely; and
3) there must have been some conduct on the part of the accountants linking them
to that party or parties, which evinces the accountants' understanding of that party
or parties' reliance.
Id. at 551, 483 N.E.2d at 118, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 443 (1985). See generally Achampong, Com-
mon Law Liability of Accountants for Negligence to Non-Contractual Parties: Recent Developments,
91 DICK. L. REV. 677, 678-80 (1987) (discussing accountants' liability in New York); Wade,
An Overview of Professional Negligence, 17 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 465, 477-78 n.50 (1987) (same).
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only economic damage."3 Writing for the court, Judge Kaye in Os-
sining Union Free School District v. Anderson LaRocca Anderson noted
that the "cause of action requires that the underlying relationship
between the parties be one of contract or the bond between them
so close as to be the functional equivalent of contractual priv-
ity."' 4 The Ossining court concluded that the defendants acted
with the "objective of . . shaping [the] plaintiff's conduct, and
thus they owed a duty of diligence .... ""
The doctrine has yet to be extended by the New York Court of
Appeals to allow recovery by third parties against attorneys.'
There are acute policy considerations which must be addressed
before the court decides whether to impose nonclient liability on a
profession which is adversarial by nature. Recently, however, in
Vereins-Und Westbank, a federal court in the Southern District of
New York interpreted New York law' 7 as providing a cause of ac-
tion in negligence against attorneys by nonclients.'8
The plaintiffs in Vereins-Und Westbank, a note assignee and a
payment bond surety, brought an action against an attorney and
his firm for negligent misrepresentation.' 9 The plaintiffs alleged
" See Ossining Union Free School District v. Anderson, 73 N.Y.2d 417, 539 N.E.2d 91,
541 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1989).
14 Id at 419, 539 N.E.2d at 93, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
15 Id at 426, 539 N.E.2d at 100, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 339-40.
" See infra note 29 and accompanying text (New York still requires privity for a non-
client to recover against an attorney).
"7 Vereins-Und Westbank, 691 F. Supp. at 711 (a federal court deciding state law should
rule as the highest court of that state would (citing Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S.
228, 234-35 (1943)).
" Id. at 709. The court evaluated New York's "Ultramares doctrine" as refined in Credit
Alliance, and determined that if the Ultramares doctrine were to be extended to attorneys,
on these facts the plaintiffs would be granted relief. Id. at 713. The Ultramares doctrine was
defined by the federal court as "liability for negligent misstatements to one not in contrac-
tual privity may attach where the statement is made for the principal purpose of having it
relied upon by such person and where its benefit to the party authorizing the statement
stems precisely from such reliance by the third party." Id. at 709. See also supra note 9 and
accompanying text (liability of accountants).
The Vereins-Und Westbank court extended Ultramares liability to attorneys by reviewing
New York decisions and determining that there is no authority that the "Ultramares doc-
trine was designed exclusively for the accounting profession." Id. at 712.
", 691 F. Supp. at 706. The defendant attorney, Barsalou, and his firm represented the
four limited partnerships involved in the action. Id. The promotor, Jeffrey Carter in-
structed Barsalou to prepare an opinion letter requested by defendant-bank Interdiscount
Ltd. (IDL) Id. Vereins extended funds to the four partnerships by purchasing notes exe-
cuted by the partnerships in favor of IDL. Id. Rockwood, a payment bond surety, guaran-
teed the obligations of the individual limited partners. Id.
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that the attorney had written opinion letters that specifically in-
vited third parties to rely upon the information provided.2" The
attorney's opinion letters stated that his client's partnership was
"duly organized, validly existing and in good standing under the
laws of the State of Texas."2 In fact, the financial criteria and
general partnership status that the claimants understood to be
requisite for the formation of the partnership were not satisfied.22
The plaintiffs, alleging their reliance on the attorney's representa-
tions, financially supported the partnership and subsequently suf-
fered losses.2"
The Vereins-Und Westbank court allowed the plaintiffs to re-
cover, finding that the attorney was aware of the likely reliance by
an assignee and surety, thereby satisfying an important element of
negligent misrepresentation under New York's Ultramares doc-
trine.2" The court stated that its decision was supported by the
New York Court of Appeals rule in Credit Alliance,25 which re-
quired that the relying party be a "known party. '26 Since these
claimants were members of an identifiable class of individuals who
20 Id. at 706-07. Barsalou's letter, stating that the limited partnership was validly formed
and in good standing under Texas law also stated "[t]his opinion may be relied upon by
IDL and its assignee under the [Note Purchase] agreement." Id. at 706. For a discussion of
the nature, purpose, legal ramifications of legal opinion letters, see generally Fuld, Legal
Opinions in Business Transactions-An Attempt to Bring Some Order Out of Some Chaos, 28 Bus.
LAW. 915, 923-32 (1973) (specific language in opinions connote certain legal meanings);
Special Comm. on Legal Opinions in Commercial Transactions, New York County Lawyers'
Ass'n, Legal Opinions to Third Parties: An Easier Path, 34 Bus. LAW. 1891, 1894 (1979) (legal
opinions vital to numerous business transactions); Note, Attorney Liability to Third Parties for
Corporate Opinion Letters, 64 B.U.L. REV. 415, 422-33 (1984) (contract and tort bases for
attorney liability to nonclient).
" Vereins-Und Westbank, 691 F. Supp. at 706. See Fuld, supra note 20, at 923-32 (discus-
sion of the effects of legally operative words).
22 Id. at 707. Each limited partner was to have contributed 20% cash as a down payment
and 80% to be paid by promissory note executed to the partnership. Id. at 706. The contri-
butions were never made. Id.
" Id. at 706. Plaintiffs alleged that "as an exercise of due care Barsalou should have
known" that the contributions were never made. Id. at 707.
24 Id. at 715. The Vereins-Und Westbank court defined the Ultramares doctrine as attach-
ing liability for negligent misstatements where "the statements [are] made for the principal
purpose of having it relied upon by such person, and where its benefit to the party author-
izing the statement stems precisely from such reliance by the third party." Id. at 709.
28 65 N.Y.2d 536, 483 N.E.2d 110, 493 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1985). See supra note 12 (discus-
sion of Credit Alliance holding).
26 Vereins-Und Westbank, 691 F. Supp. at 709 (construing Credit Alliance, 65 N.Y.2d at
551, 483 N.E.2d at 118, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 443).
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were sought out by the attorney, they were within this class.27
The Vereins-Und Westbank court reasoned that since the New
York Court of Appeals has never held that the Ultramares doc-
trine applies solely to accountants, "lawyers as a class should [not]
receive any special treatment .... Yet, the New York Court of
Appeals and lower courts of the state have consistently held, even
after the Vereins-Und Westbank decision, that absent fraud or mali-
cious conduct, an attorney would not be liable to a nonclient for
negligence. 9 It is suggested that if the New York Court of Ap-
'" Id. at 710. The "wisdom and policy [of Ultramares and Glanzer] was designed to pro-
tect a defendant from being subjected to liability for 'the explosive power resident in
words' in lawsuits brought over an 'indeterminate time' by members of 'an indeterminate
class.' " Id. (quoting Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 179, 181, 174 N.E. at 442, 444-45 (1931))
The propriety of such a requirement is generally accepted. See Averill, Attorney's Liability
to Third Persons for Negligent Malpractice, 2 LAND & WATER L. REV. 379, 391 (1967). In
Glanzer, the damages were relatively small and directly controllable by the defendants,
while in Ultramares the opposite was true due to the unknown status of the potential plain-
tiffs. Id.
" Vereins-Und Westbank, 691 F. Supp. at 712-13.
" See Crandall v. Bernard, Overton & Russell, 133 App. Div. 2d 878, 879-80, 520
N.Y.S.2d 237, 238 (3d Dep't 1987) (unless intentional wrong gives rise to duty of care,
attorney not liable to nonclient in negligence), appeal dismissed, in part, appeal denied in
part, motion dismissed, 70 N.Y.2d 940, 519 N.E.2d 618, 524 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1988); Grassi v.
Tatavito Homes, Inc., 90 App. Div. 2d 479, 480, 454 N.Y.S.2d 471, 472 (2d Dep't 1982)
(purchasers in real estate transaction have no cause of action against vendor's attorney ab-
sent fraud or other intentional wrongdoing), af'd, 58 N.Y.2d 1038, 448 N.E.2d 1356, 462
N.Y.S.2d 445 (1983); Harder v. McGinn, 89 App. Div. 2d 732, 733, 454 N.Y.S.2d 42, 43
(3d Dep't) (absent fraud, collusion, malicious or tortious act, attorney is not liable to non-
client), affd, 58 N.Y.2d 663, 664, 444 N.E.2d 1006, 458 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1982): Drago v.
Buonagurio, 61 App. Div. 2d 282, 285, 402 N.Y.S.2d 250, 252 (3d Dep't) ("[Ain attorney
in this State is not liable to third parties for negligence. ), rev'd on other grounds, 46
N.Y.2d 778, 386 N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978).
The Appellate Division in New York has not extended the Ultramares doctrine to reach
attorneys in New York. See National Westminister Bank USA v. Weksel, 124 App. Div. 2d
144, 146, 511 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1st Dep't) (where lender was not in contractual privity with
borrower's attorney, his negligence suit does not state claim upon which relief could be
granted), appeal denied, 70 N.Y.2d 604, 513 N.E.2d 1307, 519 N.Y.S.2d 1027 (1987); Le-
vine v. Graphic Scanning Corp., 87 App. Div. 2d 755, 755, 448 N.Y.S.2d 692, 693 (1st
Dep't 1982) (New York does not hold attorney liable to non-clients); Cronin v. Scott, 78
App. Div. 2d 745, 746, 432 N.Y.S.2d 656, 658 (3d Dep't 1980) (attorney is only liable to
nonclient for fraud, collusion, malicious or tortious conduct), appeal dismissed, 52 N.Y.2d
999, 419 N.E.2d 1079, 438 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1981). Although many states which require strict
privity to hold an attorney liable allow exceptions for beneficiaries under a will, New York
does not acknowledge liability in that case. See Viscardi v. Lerner, 125 App. Div. 2d 662,
664, 510 N.Y.S.2d 183, 185 (2d Dep't 1986). The Viscardi court cites Credit Alliance and
acknowledges that New York extends liability to nonprivity third parties to certain profes-
sionals. Id. It notes however, that New York maintains its strict requirement of privity for
attorneys to be liable for negligently drafted wills. Id. See also Spivey v. Pulley, 138 App.
Div. 2d 563, 564, 526 N.Y.S.2d 145, 146, (2d Dep't 1988) "[Wlhile the Court of Appeals
326
Survey of Professional Responsibility
peals were again given the opportunity to extend the Ultramares
doctrine to attorneys, it may be inclined to relax the strict privity
requirement which has consistently been a prerequisite to attor-
ney liability in New York.
II. OTHER JURISDICTIONS
A. Strict Privity Requirements
A majority of states still require privity for an individual to re-
cover in negligence for legal malpractice." Many states however,
in Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co. carved out a limited exception to the priv-
ity rule with respect to accountants, this court has repeatedly .. .declined to enlarge the
application of this exception to professionals other than accountants." Id.
On November 14, 1988, after the Vereins-Und Westbank case was decided in the federal
court, the appellate division for the second department again affirmed its adherence to the
privity requirement to hold an attorney liable to a nonclient for negligence. See Council
Commerce Corp. v. Schwartz, Sachs & Kamhi, P.C., 144 App. Div.2d 422, 424, 534
N.Y.S.2d 1,2, (2d Dep't 1988) (attorney not liable to nonclient for his reliance on a negli-
gently drafted opinion letter), appeal denied, 74 N.Y.2d 606, 543 N.E.2d 85, 544 N.Y.S.2d
820. In Council Commerce Corp, the Second Department states:
ITIhe courts of this State have not departed from this requirement in the area of
attorneys' negligence where 'Itlhe firmly established rule . . . is that absent fraud,
collusion, malicious acts or other special circumstances, an attorney is not liable to
third parties not in privity for harm caused by professional negligence.'
Id. (quoting Viscardi, 125 App. Div. 2d at 663-64, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 183).
30 See, e.g., Chalpin v. Brennan, 114 Ariz. 124, 126, 559 P.2d 680, 682 (Ct. App. 1976)(attorney not liable for material misrepresentation of fact in merger contract which led to
third party's purchase of stock); Robertson v. White, 633 F. Supp. 954, 972 (W.D. Ark.
1986) (interpreting Arkansas law, no liability for attorneys in negligence unless privity);
Weigel v. Hardesty, 37 Colo. App. 541, 543, 549 P.2d 1335, 1337 (1976) (unlike action for
fraudulent or malicious conduct, privity required for negligence action); Angel, Cohen &
Rogovin v. Oberon Investment, 512 So. 2d 192, 194 (Fla. 1987) (where there is no allega-
tion of fraud or conspiracy, plaintiffs may not bring negligence suit against defendant at-
torney who prepared sale documents): Meier v. Pearlman, 401 N.E.2d 31, 40 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1980) (no liability for attorney in negligence except for fraud), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1128 (1981); Sondes v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 501 So. 2d 829, 832 (La. Ct. App. 1986)
(liability to nonclients only when attorney acts outside scope of authority); Marker v.
Greenberg, 313 N.W.2d 4, 5 (Minn. 1981) (attorney liability without privity only if fraud
or improper motive shown); Lilyhorn v. Dier, 214 Neb. 728, 730, 335 N.W.2d 554, 555
(1983) (attorney's duty of care in drafting will does not extend to nonclient); Simon v.
Zipperstein, 32 Ohio St. 3d 74, 77, 512 N.E.2d 636, 638 (1987) (absent malice, an attorney
is immune from third party liability); Metzker v. Slocum, 272 Or. 313, 317, 537 P.2d 74,
76 (1975) (injured third party cannot maintain negligence action without privity); Guy v.
Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47, 55, 459 A.2d 744, 750 (1983) (privity required for malpractice
action based on negligence); Stinson v. Brand, 738 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Tenn. 1987) (insuffi-
cient showing of fraud for vendors to hold attorney liable in handling of real estate trans-
action); Likover v. Sunflower Terrace II, Ltd., 696 S.W.2d 468, 474 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985)
(sufficient showing of conspiracy to defraud to hold attorney liable to third party).
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permit an action in negligence only if the attorney has committed
fraud, acted maliciously,31 or the plaintiff has suffered a loss be-
cause of the attorney's negligence in drafting a will. 2 Some states
which bar a negligence action permit a contract based recovery
and limit recovery to intended beneficiaries of the contract.3
B. Third Party Beneficiary-Negligence Action
Some jurisdictions allow recovery to nonclients who can prove
third party beneficiary status34 under an attorney-client relation-
ship. 5 The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the primary
"1 See supra note 30 (cases requiring strict privity). See also Marker, 313 N.W.2d at 5
(strict privity required for attorney to be liable in tort, except for fraud or improper mo-
tive): Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 318, 401 N.W.2d 816, 821 (1987)
(absent fraud, attorney who misrepresented prior contract of sale as cancelled not liable to
the new buyers if nonclients).
Attorney fraud has also been recognized as a sole basis for recovery by nonclients. See
Arnold v. Weck, 388 So. 2d 269, 270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (attorney's false represen-
tation of settlement authority grounds for suit by nonclient); Malewich v. Zacharias, 196
N.J. Super. 372, 376-77, 482 A.2d 951, 952-53 (1984) (attorney's fraudulent representa-
tions basis for negligence action by third party).
Attorney malice is another basis for liability. See Trepel v. Pontaic Osteopathic Hospital,
135 Mich. App. 361, 354 N.W.2d 341 (1984) (privity not required for malicious prosecu-
tion action against attorney): Bull v. McCuskey, 96 Nev. 706, 615 P.2d 957 (1980) (attor-
ney's filing of malpractice suit against physician to coerce nuisance settlement subjects at-
torney to suit by third party); Johnsen v. Petersen, 43 Wash. App. 801, 719 P.2d 607
(1986) (attorney bringing suit without client's authorization can be liable to adverse party).
11 See infra note 50 and accompanying text (discussion of attorney liability for negligently
drafted will). But see Lilyhorn, 214 Neb. at 729, 335 N.W.2d at 555 (nonprivity defense
valid even in action to contest will); St. Mary's Church of Schuyler v. Tomek, 212 Neb.
728, 325 N.W.2d 164 (1982) (same).
" See Angel, Cohen & Rogovin, 512 So.2d at 194 (intended third party beneficiary may
sue attorney if his negligence causes legacy to be lost or diminished): Guy, 501 Pa. at 47,
459 A.2d at 750-51 (nonclient may recover against attorney if he can establish intended
beneficiary status under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302).
" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1979). A third party beneficiary is
defined in the following way:
(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of a
promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in the
beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and either
(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay
money to the beneficiary; or
(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the
benefit of the promised performance
(2) An incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary who is not an intended beneficiary.
Id. See Guy, 501 Pa. at 47, 450 A.2d at 744 (1983) (third party beneficiary action can be
properly restricted by principles of Restatement (Second) of Contracts).
11 See Bush v. Rewald, 619 F. Supp. 585, 596 (D.C. Haw. 1985) (attorney's liability to
nonclient investors limited to intended beneficiary of advice or third party beneficiary);
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purpose of the attorney-client relationship was to benefit the non-
client 6 as well as prove all the elements of negligence.37 This ap-
proach limits the liability of the attorney, yet allows equitable re-
lief for certain injured nonclients3 8
C. Multi-Criteria Balancing Test
To circumvent contractual privity requirements, 9 California
courts first developed a liberal multi-criteria test that balances pol-
icy considerations and bases recovery by third parties on an attor-
ney's breach of a legal duty. 40 This approach provides for a great
Security Nat'l Bank v. Lish, 311 A.2d 833, 834-35 (D.C. App. 1973) (where information
sent directly to third parties, they are considered third party beneficiaries). Pelham v.
Griesheimer, 92 Ill. 2d 13, 21, 440 N.E.2d 96, 100 (1982) (nonclient may sue attorney in
negligence but must prove primary purpose of attorney-client relationship was to benefit or
influence third party): Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902, 906 (Iowa 1978) (third party bene-
ficiary may recover so long as party is "direct and intended beneficiary of the lawyer's
services"), Hill v. Willmott, 561 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (attorney may be
liable for negligence to intended beneficiary of his actions); Capital Bank & Trust Co. v.
Core, 343 So.2d 284, 287-88 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (adopts liability to nonclient where con-
tract entered to benefit third party); Flaherty v. Weinberg, 303 Md. 116, 492 A.2d 618,
625 (1985). A nonclient must claim and prove that the attorney client relationship had the
"direct purpose" of benefitting the nonclient. Id. at 625. The intent must have actually
existed, it is not enough to show it was a mere possibility. Id. See also Clagett v. Dacy, 47
Md. App. 23, 420 A.2d 1285, 1289 (1980) (court allowed "a modest relaxation of the strict
privity requirement in allowing third party beneficiary to recover."); Page v. Frazier, 388
Mass. 55, 65, 445 N.E.2d 148, 154 (1983) (recovery denied since attorney's 'precise pur-
pose' was not to benefit plaintiff). See generally Note, Attorney's Liability to Third Parties for
Malpractice: The Growing Acceptance of Liability in the Absence of Privity, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 48,
59 (1981) (to impose liability, intent of attorney to benefit third party must be primary or
direct purpose of transaction).
3 See supra note 35 and accompanying text (cases cited demonstrate nonclient's require-
ment of showing third party beneficiary status).
"T See Pelham, 92 11. 2d at 18, 440 N.E.2d at 98. "A complaint for negligence, to be
legally sufficient, must set out facts that establish the existence of a duty owed by the de-
fendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and an injury proximately resulting from the
breach." Id. (citing Cunis v. Brennan, 56 Ill. 2d 372, 374, 308 N.E.2d 617, 618 (1974)). See
also Flaherty, 303 Md. at 131, 492 A.2d at 625. "If the third party alleges and proves the
remaining elements of a negligence cause of action, he can recover against the attorney in
negligence." Id.
s See Bradford Sec. Processing Ser. v. Plaza Bank & Trust, 653 P.2d 188 (Okla. 1982)
(attorney liable to reasonably foreseeable third party for negligently issued opinion), con-
strued in Note, Negligence: Bradford Securities Processing Service v. Plaza Bank & Trust:
Expansion of Attorney's Professional Negligence Liability to Third Parties in Oklahoma, 36 OKLA.
L. REv. 372 (1983); Note, supra note 1, at 127-29 (discussing allocation of risk between
attorney and third party).
39 See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (traditionally, lawyers had to be in privity
with party to recover in negligence).
40 See Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958). The Supreme Court of
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deal of judicial discretion and flexibility in granting relief to non-
client plaintiffs.41 California courts weigh: "(1) the extent to which
the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff;42 (2) the fore-
seeability of harm to him; (3) the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury; (4) the closeness of the connection be-
tween the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered; (5) the pol-
icy consideration of preventing future harm;43and, (6) the extent
to which recognition of liability would impose an undue burden
on the legal profession.""
California held that a notary public could be held liable to beneficiaries of negligently certi-
fied will. Id. at 651, 320 P.2d at 18. Biakanja established a six part case-by-case balancing
test to determine if a duty was owed to third parties in negligence actions. Id. at 650, 320
P.2d at 19. See also infra footnotes 42-47 and accompanying text (list of multi-criteria test).
California was the first state to extend a cause of action in malpractice against attorneys
for certain third party nonclients. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 589, 364 P.2d 685,
688, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 824 (1961), cert. denied, 368 US 987 (1962). See supra notes 42-44
(sets forth Lucas test). The Lucas court noted that as between a negligent attorney and an
innocent third party, the burden on the attorney was warranted. Id. at 589, 364 P.2d at
688. 15 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
Biakanja's rule was modified in subsequent cases as it was applied to lawyers. See Lucas, 56
Cal. 2d at 588, 364 P.2d at 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 824 (multi-criteria balancing test applied
to attorneys in action under a will); Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 227, 449 P.2d 161, 164,
74 Cal. Rptr. 225, 228 (1969) (tort remedy under Lucas held preferable to third party
beneficiary analysis); Donald v. Garry, 19 Cal. App. 3d 769, 771, 97 Cal. Rptr. 191, 192
(1971) (third party creditor receiving percentage of debt has cause of action against attor-
ney of collection agency when he shows lack of diligence in prosecuting claim); Goodman
v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 342-43, 556 P.2d 737, 742, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375, 380 (1976)
(acknowledged attorney's duty of care to third party beneficiaries or those to whom advice
could be foreseeably transmitted); Cicone v. URS Corp., 183 Cal. App. 3d 194, 210, 227
Cal. Rptr. 887, 897 (1986) (attorney liable for misrepresentation of material fact made to
third-party's attorney for purpose of influencing client).
" Cicone, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 210, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 897 (attorney liable for opinion
letters to third party without privity using balancing criteria); Albright v. Burns, 206 N.J.
Super. 625, 632, 503 A.2d 386, 389-90 (1986) (testator's attorney liable to intended bene-
ficiary even though there was no contact between them).
42 See Lucas, 56 Cal. 2d at 588, 364 P.2d at 687, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 823 (1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 987 (1962). The first criteria is similar to, yet less stringent for the plaintiff than
the third party beneficiary test which requires the plaintiff to prove that the primary pur-
pose of the contract was to benefit the third party. Pelham v. Griesheimer, 92 Ill. 2d 13,
440 N.E.2d 96, 100 (1982). Although supposedly less stringent, the Biakanja court uses the
"end and aim" test of Glanzer to analyze this first criteria. Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d
647, 320 P.2d 16, 17 (1954). See supra note 6 and accompanying text (outlines Glanzer
court's approach).
"' Lucas, 56 Cal. 2d at 588, 364 P.2d at 687, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
44 Id. at 589, 364 P.2d at 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 823-24. Originally the sixth element as
stated in Biakanja considered the "moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct ...."
Biakanja, 49 Cal. 2d at 650, 320 P.2d at 19. The California Supreme Court later replaced
moral blame with the amount of burden the liability would place on the legal profession.
Lucas, 56 Cal. 2d at 589, 364 P.2d at 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 824. The Lucas court deter-
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Unlike the third party beneficiary test,4 under the multi-crite-
ria balancing test the claimant need not establish restrictive in-
tended beneficiary status.46 Recently, however, the California
courts in some circumstances have developed a trend toward ap-
plying the stricter "end and aim" test of Glanzer.1 Where the suit
between claimant and attorney arises from a prior conflict be-
tween the parties as opposed to a nonadversarial proceeding (for
instance the execution of a will) a claimant has a greater burden
of proving that he was owed a duty of care by the attorney.48
The multi-criteria test has been called confusing and vague and
has been criticized for allowing a broad category of plaintiffs to
recover.4" Some states limit this more liberal standard to benefi-
ciaries who were wronged by a testator's attorney.50
mined that the burden was warranted, especially since the plaintiff was an innocent party.
Id.
" See supra note 35 (explanation of third party beneficiary test).
" See Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47, 57, 459 A.2d 744, 746 (1983) (discussion of the
faults of California's broad recovery).
41 See supra note 7 and accompanying test (outlines Glanzer test).
4 See Cicone v. URS Corp, 183 Cal. App. 3d 194, 209-210, 227 Cal. Rptr. 887, 896-97
(1986) (California court applied Glanzer to determine if there was duty owed to nonclient
and then considered public policy). The Cicone court stated that "where an attorney in-
tends his advice or statement to his client to be relied upon by third persons dealing with
his client, the attorney owes the third person a duty of care." Id. [emphasis in original]
Once a duty has been established, the California analysis requires a balancing of the multi-
criteria test to determine if it is against public policy for a nonclient to recover. Id.
" See, e.g., Pelham v. Griesheimer, 92 I11. 2d 13, 22, 440 N.E.2d 96, 100 (1982) (analogy
to "third-party direct beneficiaries to determine the duty owed to a nonclient by an attor-
ney in a negligence action provides for ... a narrower scope of liability than the balancing
approach used in California"); Guy, 501 Pa. at 57, 459 A.2d at 746 ("Lucas standard is too
broad").
" See, e.g., Fickett v. Superior Court of Pima County, 27 Ariz. App. 793, 795, 558 P.2d
988, 990 (1976) (Arizona applies balancing test to determine third party beneficiary's
rights against attorney): Pelham, 92 III. 2d at 20, 440 N.E.2d at 100 (unless nonadversarial
case, as in beneficiaries under will, Illinois employs third party beneficiary rational); Marker
v. Greenberg, 313 N.W.2d 4, 5-6 (Minn. 1981) (balancing test applied to determine attor-
ney's duty to beneficiaries); Guy, 501 Pa. 61, 459 A.2d at 746 (Pennsylvania only allows
named legatees to recover): Auric v. Continental Ca. Co, 111 Wis. 2d 507, 331 N.W.2d
325, 329 (1983) (Wisconsin court cited Lucas to allow recovery to beneficiaries under will).
But see Lilyhorn v. Dier, 214 Neb. 728, 729, 335 N.W.2d 554, 555 (1983) (privity defense
valid even in will contexts); St. Mary's Church of Schuyler v. Tomecki, 212 Neb. 728, 729,
325 N.W.2d 164, 167 (1982) (same); Viscardi v. Lerner, 125 App. Div. 2d 662, 664, 510
N.Y.S.2d 183, 185 (2d Dep't 1986) (same).
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CONCLUSION
The issue of professional liability to nonclients will continue to
arise in the judicial setting. As additional exceptions are carved,
the courts will be forced to address the privity requirements as it
relates to attorneys. The majority of states, including New York,
still require privity in order to recover in negligence from an at-
torney while acting in his professional capacity. Those states that
do not require strict privity have articulated various tests to deter-
mine whether or not an attorney owed a duty of care to a non-
client. It is submitted that the strict privity requirment is in jeop-
ardy in New York and courts may expose attorneys to liability for
professional negligence to plaintiffs with whom they are not in
privity.
Melinda R. Katz
JUDICIAL IMMUNITY IN BAR ADMISSIONS
Each state establishes its own bar admission procedures which
require the applicant to meet certain character and fitness crite-
ria.1 Generally, the qualifications for admission require a prospec-
tive attorney to possess a bachelor's degree, a law degree from an
approved school,2 to pass a written examination,3 and to establish
Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) § 21:101. See, e.g., Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957) (state can require bar applicants to possess certain
qualifications to be eligible for admission).
Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) § 21:101. Graduation from an ABA-ap-
proved law school is to "provide uniform and measurable standards by which to assess the
qualifications of applicants." LaBossiere v. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, 279 So. 2d 288,
289 (Fla. 1973). There is reliance on the ABA due to the fact that state supreme courts are
"unequipped to make such a determination ... because of financial limitations and the
press of judicial business." Id.
California has a "Baby Bar" requirement that students attending law schools not ap-
proved by California's Committee of Bar Examiners must take and pass an exam at the end
of their first year so as to receive credit from the Committee for further study. See Lupert
v. California State Bar, 761 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir.) (upheld constitutionality of Baby
Bar), cert. denied, and appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 916 (1985).
1 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) § 21:101. See Richardson v. McFadden, 540
F.2d 744, 748 (4th Cir. 1976) (purpose of bar examination is to distinguish between those
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